**Compromise vs. Compromises:**

**Preferences for Bipartisanship in the American Electorate**

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**Abstract**

Public opinion surveys regularly assert that Americans want political leaders to work together and to engage in bipartisan compromise. If so, why has Congress become increasingly acrimonious even though the American public wants it to be “bipartisan”? Many scholars claim that this is simply a breakdown of representation. We offer another explanation: although people profess support for “bipartisanship” in an abstract sense, what they desire procedurally out of their party representatives in Congress is to not compromise with the other side. To test this argument, we conduct two experiments in which we alter aspects of the political context to see how people respond to parties (not) coming together to achieve broadly popular public policy goals. We find that citizens’ proclaimed desire for bipartisanship in actuality reflects self-serving partisan desires. Consequently, members of Congress do not have electoral incentives to reach across to aisle to build costly bipartisan coalitions.

One of the most copiously documented and studied trends in American politics has been the partisan polarization of elected representatives, particularly in the U.S. Congress (e.g., [McCarty et al. 2006](#_ENREF_53); [Theriault 2008](#_ENREF_75)). Closely tied to increased elite polarization is a decline in legislative cooperation. Recent decades—and recent years in particular—have been characterized by Congress becoming increasingly dysfunctional and unable to craft bipartisan agreements on important legislation ([Mann and Ornstein 2006](#_ENREF_51); [2012](#_ENREF_52)). For instance, the crisis over the U.S. government’s inability to compromise and raise the debt ceiling, a routine procedure in previous years, resulted in the unprecedented downgrading of the United States’ credit rating in 2011 ([Appelbaum and Dash 2011](#_ENREF_4)). Some commentators even feel that the inability of political elites to compromise and complete the basic business of government such as passing budgets and appropriations bills threatens the “system of constitutional democracy” ([Mann and Ornstein 2012](#_ENREF_52)). Guttman and Thompson ([2012](#_ENREF_34)) argue that while campaigning requires politicians to focus on principles, governing requires compromise. As such, the disappearance of this ability to negotiate across the aisle may have tremendous social and political costs. These concerns raise the question of why elected officials behave in this manner and whether such behavior is grounded in electoral motivations. Accordingly, this paper addresses the following question: To what extent is the partisan conflict of congressional politics incongruent with public preferences and the electoral incentives of members, particularly given that Americans profess a general desire for bipartisanship among their representatives?

### While the presence of partisan conflict in recent years is apparent, the causes are unclear, especially as they relate to their basis in, or violation of, public preferences. However, knowing whether the public wants political compromise but is being denied it by political leaders is important for addressing a number of scholarly questions, including the quality of representation, expectations of electoral outcomes following prolonged policy gridlock, and for assumptions about public preferences in theoretical research.[[2]](#footnote-2)

### Within Congress, partisan conflict may not only be the result of policy disagreement (which may be rooted in constituency preferences) but of long-term strategic considerations to deny the opposing party victories (over even commonly-agreed upon legislation) that may be used for electoral benefit later on. For example, in their discussion of the health care debate in 2009, Gutmann and Thompson ([2012, 113](#_ENREF_34)) note how Senator Jim DeMint of South Carolina urged his fellow Republicans to work against compromise on the legislation and even against a bipartisan reform so that Democrats would suffer political losses. They quote DeMint as saying, “If we’re able to stop Obama on this, it will be his Waterloo. It will break him.” Further, the comity and friendliness of members has declined over time. Whereas norms sustained reciprocity in Congress in the 1960s, Congress has become much less cordial in recent decades. Uslaner ([1993, 1](#_ENREF_77)) suggests that “without reciprocity, policy-making becomes more difficult and some of the most pressing problems facing the nation go unresolved.” A textual analysis by Gary King found that 27% of communication of members of Congress in floor speeches consists of taunting the opposition ([Fahrenthold 2011](#_ENREF_25)). *PS: Political Science* devoted a symposium in the summer of 2012 to the issue of political civility and its connection to partisanship, compromise, representation, and governing ([Strachan and Wolf 2012](#_ENREF_72); [Maisel 2012](#_ENREF_49); [Shea and Sproveri 2012](#_ENREF_67); [Geer 2012](#_ENREF_28); [Wolf et al. 2012](#_ENREF_82); [Jamieson and Hardy 2012](#_ENREF_41)). In nearly all cases, the assessment of Congress in this arena is negative.

### Given its perceived dysfunctionality, it is unsurprising that Congress suffers from the lowest approval figures of any American political institution, with ratings in the 20s since at least 2005 and in the teens more recently ([Polling Report 2012](#_ENREF_61)). An *NBC News/Wall Street Journal* poll conducted in December 2011 found that only 3% of Americans rated the 112th Congress as “above average” while 75% rated it as “below average” or “one of the worst ever” ([NBC News/Wall Street Journal 2011](#_ENREF_57)). A majority of Americans overwhelmingly disapprove of the performance of both parties in Congress, under both Republican and Democratic control.

### Judging from recent polling, at first glance, it appears that the partisan acrimony in Congress is at odds with Americans’ stated desires; national poll after national poll asserts that Americans want political leaders to work together and to engage in bipartisan compromise. For example, a CBS poll ([2009](#_ENREF_17)) asked, “Looking ahead, which comes closer to your view? The Democrats won a majority in Congress and should generally try to pass legislation that they think is right for the country, even if Republicans don’t support it. The Democrats should generally try to pass legislation that receives bipartisan support from Republicans in Congress.” 60% of respondents chose the bipartisan option while 32% said they wanted Democrats to pass their own legislation. Similarly, a 2006 poll conducted by National Public Radio found that 71% of survey respondents preferred that Democrats and Republicans work together in a bipartisan way instead of sticking to the policies they committed to in the election ([NPR 2006](#_ENREF_58)). Pew Research ([2012, 55](#_ENREF_60)) reported that 80% of respondents, and majorities of both parties, agreed with the following statement: “I like political leaders who are willing to make compromises in order to get the job done.” Support for compromise⎯framed in this way⎯has been consistent over the last 15 years.[[3]](#footnote-3)

 These polling responses raise the question: Why has Congress become increasingly acrimonious and polarized even though the American public wants it to be “bipartisan”? Some scholars claim that this is simply a breakdown of representation. Fiorina and Abrams ([2009](#_ENREF_26)) argue that there is a “disconnect” between the median voter and political elites ([see also Bafumi and Herron 2010](#_ENREF_7)). Although the cause of this breakdown is unknown, scholars have pointed to myriad factors to explain congressional partisanship, including pressures in party primaries (e.g., [Brady et al. 2007](#_ENREF_10); [Burden 2001](#_ENREF_13), [2004](#_ENREF_14)), competition for majority control (e.g., [Cox and McCubbins 2005](#_ENREF_20); [Lee 2009](#_ENREF_47); [Hacker and Pierson 2005](#_ENREF_35)), and the influence of special interest money (e.g., [Sinclair 2006](#_ENREF_69); [Rae 2007](#_ENREF_62); [Wand 2012](#_ENREF_78)). More generally, Fiorina and colleagues have pointed to changes in political institutions and procedures as well as social change during the past half century that have magnified the importance of the political class relative to the average citizen ([Fiorina and Abrams 2009, 75](#_ENREF_26); [Fiorina et al. 2005](#_ENREF_27)).

We offer another explanation: although people profess support for “bipartisanship” in an abstract sense, what they desire procedurally out of their party representatives in Congress is to not compromise with the other side. In other words, there may not be a breakdown of representation at all. Members of Congress do not have electoral incentives to reach across to aisle to build costly bipartisan coalitions, especially on important floor votes or in other activities where the partisan alternatives are clear. Working across party lines may not only be costly in terms of the time and effort involved but also in terms of the potential threats members face from primary constituencies as well as opposition from interest groups outside the mainstream.

This conjecture, on its face, may seem obvious given previous findings that suggest that people often abandon abstract principles when forced to apply them in specific circumstances. Consider the extensive literature on political tolerance which finds that although Americans believe in civil liberties in an broad sense, they do not support applying those liberties to unpopular groups (e.g. communists, atheists, racists) (e.g., [Sullivan et al. 1982](#_ENREF_73); [Stouffer 1955](#_ENREF_71); [Mondak and Sanders 2003](#_ENREF_54)). Similarly, Jacoby ([2000](#_ENREF_40)) finds that while Americans want to reduce general government spending, they are hesitant to make cuts when faced with choices on specific programs.

However, several other studies have suggested that people’s abstract and specific desires for various aspects of government align quite closely. For instance, consider the stated preference for divided government and partisan balance by many Americans (“cognitive Madisonianism”) ([Ladd 1990](#_ENREF_45)). Although some previous work was skeptical that individuals truly preferred divided government and in actuality may have just wanted their own party to have increased power ([e.g., Sigelman et al. 1997](#_ENREF_68)), others found evidence of relatively fixed support for divided government unconfounded by party control ([Smith et al. 1999](#_ENREF_70); [Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2004](#_ENREF_48)). Similarly, not only do Americans support an abstract notion of federalism ([Reeves 1987](#_ENREF_64)) but they demonstrate a surprisingly strong ability to hold meaningful preferences over functional responsibility and to match these to causal attributions ([Arceneaux 2005](#_ENREF_5), [2006](#_ENREF_6); [Schneider and Jacoby 2012](#_ENREF_66)). Additionally, conceptions of federalism can combat partisan bias in attributions ([Malhotra 2008](#_ENREF_50); [though see Brown 2010](#_ENREF_12)). Hence, it is not obvious that abstract and specific preferences should diverge in American’s preferences for bipartisanship in Congress.

Recent evidence in Congress also paints an unclear picture. While most previous studies of partisan acrimony have addressed it at an institutional level (e.g., [Theriault 2008](#_ENREF_75); [McCarty et al. 2006](#_ENREF_53); [Lee 2009](#_ENREF_47)), surprisingly less research has attempted to unpack the “electoral connection” by assessing mass opinions toward Congressional polarization. Much of the research on public preferences focuses on a general unhappiness with partisan discord in Congress (e.g., [Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995](#_ENREF_37); [Kimball and Patterson 1997](#_ENREF_44); [Durr et al. 1997](#_ENREF_24)). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse ([1995, 47](#_ENREF_37)) write, “People profess a devotion to democracy in the abstract but have little or no appreciation for what a practicing democracy invariably brings with it... People do not wish to see uncertainty, conflicting opinions, long debate, competing interests, confusion, bargaining, and compromised, imperfect decisions. They want government to do its job quietly and efficiently.” Overall, the work of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse ([1995](#_ENREF_37), [2001](#_ENREF_38), [2002](#_ENREF_39)) characterizes compromise as both something that the public may want from Congress but also as one of the institutional features that leads to frustration with the policy process.

In terms of electoral incentives, Carson et al. ([2010](#_ENREF_16)) observe that members are punished for excessive partisanship and Ramirez ([2009](#_ENREF_63)) finds that partisan conflict in Congress affects institutional approval. Both findings suggest that the public values bipartisanship and compromise. Other work ties together preferences for compromise and civility but again suggests that the public desires that government has these features. Mutz and Reeves ([2005](#_ENREF_56)) argue that incivility in the political process affects trust in government, while Fiorina and Abrams ([2009, xix-xx](#_ENREF_26)) suggest that “the dogmatic, divisive and uncivil style of ‘debate’ engaged in by many members of the political class is not appreciated by ordinary Americans, who are for the most party far less certain, more open to compromise, and more polite than their leaders.” In contrast, Wolf et al. ([2012](#_ENREF_82)) suggest that heightened political interest and mobilization among those who want politicians to stick to their principles exacerbates political conflict and incivility, a claim that is consistent with observations that obstructionism yielded electoral success for Republicans in 2010 ([Mann and Ornstein 2012, 102](#_ENREF_52)). Accordingly, Harbridge and Malhotra ([2011](#_ENREF_36)) offer a paradox: although people might prefer that Congress as a whole be more bipartisan, strong partisans approve of individual members *more* when they engage in partisanship.

In sum, there are reasons to believe that the public expresses a genuine desire for bipartisanship and yet there is also evidence to suggest that the public’s attitudes toward bipartisanship is cheap talk when couched in broad and loose terms. Our goal is to go beyond existing studies that have sought to assess people’s preferences for bipartisanship in an abstract sense and to better understand what they mean by that term concretely, and in particular, when they are evaluating congressional policymaking. This will allow us to better assess the degree of representation in contemporary politics. In doing so, we build on extant research discussed above that has attempted to understand Americans’ views towards gridlock, polarization, and procedure in Congress. To do so, we conduct two experiments in which we alter aspects of the political context to see how people respond to parties (not) coming together to achieve broadly popular public policy goals. Specifically, we investigate preferences for bipartisanship and attitudes toward Congress and its output by (1) portraying bipartisanship as either an equal compromise or a capitulation by one side and (2) altering the partisan distribution of roll call votes on specific pieces of legislation.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The first section provides a theoretical framework for understanding why preferences for compromise diverge between more abstract questions and evaluations of specific instances of policy making. The following section provides an overview of our experimental approach to unpacking the abstruse concept of bipartisanship. We then present the designs and findings of our two studies. We conclude by summarizing the results of our experiments and their implications for how to interpret public sentiment toward bipartisanship as well as political elites’ incentives to pursue compromise and expend the costs to construct bipartisan coalitions in Congress.

**Theoretical Framework**

Consider the two contrasting views of bipartisanship laid out by Indiana Senator Richard Lugar (often described as conservative but willing to reach across the aisle in a bipartisan fashion to pass policies) and Richard Mourdock, who defeated Lugar in the 2012 Republican primary:

Bipartisanship is not the opposite of principle. One can be very conservative or very liberal and still have a bipartisan mindset. Such a mindset acknowledges that the other party is also patriotic and may have some good ideas. It acknowledges that national unity is important, and that aggressive partisanship deepens cynicism, sharpens political vendettas, and depletes the national reserve of good will that is critical to our survival in hard times ([Lugar quoted in Zapler 2012](#_ENREF_83)).

I have a mindset that says bipartisanship ought to consist of Democrats coming to the Republican point of view ([Mourdock quoted in Weinger 2012](#_ENREF_79)).

We hypothesize that people express an abstract preference for Lugar’s conception of bipartisanship, but when confronted with the specifics of actual policymaking, they prefer outcomes along the lines of Mourdock’s statement. Thus, bipartisanship is desired to the extent that compromises come from the opposing side rather than one’s own side. As Gutmann and Thompson ([2012, 27](#_ENREF_34)) write, people “say yes to compromise, but no to compromises.”

Bipartisanship in public discourse is often conceived in abstract terms as parties working together to achieve common ends. However, a review of recent polls measuring public preferences for bipartisanship shows that the concept is often not used in clear or consistent terms. Analysis of the word “bipartisan” in survey questions on Congress or the President in Roper’s iPoll database (1985-2011) indicates that 113 questions provide no definition or a vague usage, 5 questions use bipartisan to indicate conceding positions or beliefs, and 11 questions use bipartisan to indicate mutual agreement. Similarly, of survey questions using the word “compromise,” 153 offer no definition or a vague usage, 50 use the term to suggest compromise involves conceding positions or beliefs, and 28 are about mutual agreement. As a result, recent polling offers little help in unpacking how people interpret the term “bipartisan” when expressing their ideal level of compromise.

Our main contention is that citizens proclaim a desire for bipartisanship in an abstract sense but when confronted with the specifics of policymaking, they exhibit self-serving partisan desires. As a result, members of Congress do not have incentives to engage in genuine compromise and build bipartisan coalitions in passing legislation. We do not argue that public preferences for partisanship have been the main factor driving elite polarization; rather, we suggest that partisan conflict is consistent with the electoral incentives of members and that citizen preferences may reinforce elite polarization.

We hypothesize that people are attracted to bipartisanship conceptually because it is associated with compromise and consensus, which have positive valence ([Weisberg 1980](#_ENREF_80); [Dennis 1988a](#_ENREF_21), [1988b](#_ENREF_22)). Moderation, open-mindedness, and independence are considered positive traits and people like thinking of themselves in these terms ([Keith et al. 1992](#_ENREF_43); [Kamieniecki 1988](#_ENREF_42)). Consequently, when asked about whether they want parties to work together without any specifics of the process or outcomes, people are attracted to words or phrases with positive valence such as “work together.” Professing an abstract desire for bipartisanship allows people to conceive of themselves as even-handed.[[4]](#footnote-4)

At the same time, political partisanship is an important social identity for Americans ([Brewer 1991](#_ENREF_11); [Mullen et al. 1991](#_ENREF_55); [Greene 2004](#_ENREF_32), [1999](#_ENREF_31)). In addition to providing a perceptual screen that affects the way people view and process information ([Campbell et al. 1960](#_ENREF_15); [Bartels 2002](#_ENREF_8); [Taber and Lodge 2006](#_ENREF_74)), partisanship represents an attachment to others whereby individuals see themselves as part of a group ([Green et al. 2002](#_ENREF_30)). When they evaluate a specific compromise or a manifestation of bipartisanship, this social identity is activated and people perceive lawmaking as an instance of group conflict. Even if people’s policy preferences align with a bipartisan outcome (i.e. the result of both parties conceding ground), the procedure involved with one’s in-group fighting with an out-group affects perceptions of fairness and primes partisanship in attitude formation, elevating the value of winning above collective policy benefits.

From this framework, we hypothesize that when confronted with concrete instances of policymaking, people will not prefer bipartisan compromises and coalitions to more partisan outcomes. This is most likely to be the case when the positions of each party are known and thus the “winners” and “losers” in a given outcome are clear. However, even when positions are less obvious, we suggest that partisan cues about the coalition may still limit support for bipartisanship in policymaking. That is, a coalition made up predominantly of in-group members may be viewed as favorably as a mixed coalition of both in-group and out-group members, with party cue effects offsetting the positive valence associated with bipartisanship. Moreover, we hypothesize that these patterns will be driven by those who express an abstract desire for bipartisanship and not just by those who willingly state a preference for partisan principles.

**Overview of Studies**

 To test our conjectures, we conducted two experimental studies, both designed to assess a different part of our argument that generically stated desires for bipartisanship ultimately reflect partisan interests. We also assessed whether the findings were driven by those individuals who expressed an abstract preference for bipartisanship. If the findings are concentrated only among those who do *not* express a general bipartisan disposition, it would not explain the potential disconnect between abstract and specific desires described earlier. In total, the studies demonstrate the self-serving nature of people’s conceptions of bipartisanship and that party leaders have few electoral incentives to seek partners from across the aisle to craft legislation.

In each study, we focus on a relatively low-salience yet broadly popular issue where the experimental conditions are realistic. This decreases the level of pre-treatment bias in studying issues where attitudes may have hardened ([Druckman and Leeper 2012](#_ENREF_23)). Further, we focus on relatively obscure issues in which there are not existing partisan divisions (unlike, e.g., gun control, taxes, abortion) since it is these less overtly partisan issues for which we would expect to find greater opportunities for common ground. The issues we study therefore represent tough tests of the theory. The manipulations are intended to alter various aspects of congressional procedure and the policymaking process to assess how people’s support for legislation and their perceptions of bipartisanship change according to different aspects of institutions such as the byproduct of negotiations and the nature of coalitions.[[5]](#footnote-5) Importantly, our experimental design allows us to evaluate how the public evaluates bipartisan and partisan outcomes without relying on questions that explicitly focus on whether compromise is preferred to politicians sticking to their positions and thus cue the positive valence considerations of the compromising response. In Study #1, we ask people to assess a passed policy but vary the outcome of the negotiation, with some outcomes favoring a given party’s position and others representing a more equitable compromise. In Study #2, we ask people to assess a passed policy where we hold the characteristics of the policy fixed but vary the composition of the coalition that supported the policy. Thus, these studies are akin to the evaluations made by voters after seeing congressional policy outcomes and they allow for increased ecological validity since this is similar to how voters evaluate Congress prior to an election. Our approach avoids potential inaccuracies with simply asking individuals to report a preference for bipartisanship by assessing the manifestation of voter preferences in their evaluation of policy outcomes instead ([Wilson and Nisbett 1978](#_ENREF_81)).

 The studies were conducted by GfK Knowledge Networks over the Internet between January 28, 2012, and February 11, 2012. GfK Knowledge Networks recruits a nationally representative panel via address-based sampling and random digit dialing (RDD). Panelists are invited to complete the survey and are provided various forms of compensation in exchange for their participation, including complementary Internet access. We emphasize that GfK Knowledge Networks collects extremely high-quality data, employing high-cost probability sampling to construct a nationally representative panel and does not rely on volunteers to opt in to participate ([Chang and Krosnick 2009](#_ENREF_19)). 1,666 panelists were invited to participate in the survey; the final sample size was 1,059, yielding a completion rate of 63.6%. The AAPOR CUMRR1 cumulative response rate was 6.3%. All question wordings and response options are provided in the study descriptions below. The order of response options was randomly rotated, with half of respondents receiving the order presented in the text and the other half receiving the reverse order. The order of the two studies described below were randomly presented to respondents, eliminating treatment spillover bias ([Transue et al. 2009](#_ENREF_76)). Item non-response was not an issue in the data. Across the eight dependent variables analyzed below, the completion rate ranged between 95.5%-99.5%.

 At the beginning of the survey, all respondents were asked to report their party identification using the standard branched format used by the American National Election Studies: “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or what?” Respondents reporting “Independent” or another response were then asked: “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic party or the Republican party?” (response options: “Democratic party,” “Republican party”). For all analyses below, we divide respondents into Republicans and Democrats, pooling together leaners with partisans ([following Keith et al. 1992](#_ENREF_43)). Twenty respondents did not respond to the leaning question and are therefore considered pure Independents, so the analyses below are analyzed using 1,039 respondents.[[6]](#footnote-6)

 We measured respondents’ abstract conception of bipartisanship by asking them: “Which of the following roles would you like to see elected representatives play?” (response options: “Work in a bipartisan way and be willing to compromise with others to make progress on important problems,” “Stand firm with their party on issues and stick to their principles without compromise”).[[7]](#footnote-7) 78.7% of respondents provided the bipartisan response to this item, in line with the polling results mentioned above. We use this question to assess if the self-serving nature of people’s conceptions of bipartisanship emerges among those who express an abstract desire for the parties to work together. If so, then it would help explain why even in the face of seemingly broad support for bipartisanship, elected officials do not seem to be responsive to citizen desires. If instead the effects were solely concentrated among those who are not bipartisan, then it would reflect more of a disconnect in representation. For simplicity, we refer to respondents who provide the bipartisan response to this item below as “bipartisan respondents” (in contrast to “partisan respondents”).

 Randomization checks confirmed that experimental conditions for both studies were statistically and substantively similar on all observed pre-treatment variables (see Appendices A and B). Because the data are experimental, we do not need to control for potentially confounding covariates in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the treatment effects. Nonetheless, as both a robustness check because unbiasedness due to randomization is a large sample property ([Gerber and Green 2012](#_ENREF_29)) and because controlling for covariates increases the efficiency of estimates ([Angrist and Pischke 2009](#_ENREF_3)), we also estimate regression models which include a set of demographic controls (see Online Appendix 1).

**Study 1**

 *Design*. We presented respondents with competing proposals from both Congressional Republicans and Democrats to cut NASA spending. We then randomized the outcome of the negotiation between the parties and assessed how respondents reacted to the outcome.

President Obama and the Republican leadership in the House of Representatives are currently negotiating on how much spending to cut from NASA (the National Aeronautics and Space Administration) in 2013. In 2012, NASA’s budget was approximately $19 billion.

President Obama and the Democrats propose cutting $200 million from NASA.

Speaker of the House Boehner and the Republicans propose cutting $400 million from the budget.

Suppose that the outcome of the negotiations was that $[X] million in NASA spending was cut.

We randomly assign respondents to receive one of three values of X: (1) $225 million, the outcome being closer to what the congressional Democrats wanted; (2) $375 million, the outcome being closer to what the congressional Republicans wanted; and (3) $300 million, the outcome exactly in between the two competing positions. By providing respondents with the preferences of each party, as well as with the outcome, respondents are able to consider the result of the negotiation in the context of alternative outcomes, how much each side compromises, and which side appears to be the winner.

 We recode the treatment conditions based on the respondent’s party identification: (1) “own-party wins” (i.e. Democrats in the “$225 million outcome” condition and Republicans in the “$375 million outcome” conditions); (2) “other party wins” (i.e. Democrats in the “$375 million outcome” conditions and Republicans in the “$225 million outcome” conditions); and (3) the “$300 million” even bipartisan split condition. This allows us to pool respondents together in a single analysis. For this study as well as Study 2, we also assessed whether treatment effects varied across Republicans and Democrats; we did not find this to be the case (see Online Appendix 2).[[8]](#footnote-8) Hence, we report results from the pooled sample.

 *Hypotheses*. We expect respondents to be more supportive of outcomes that reflect “wins” by their party, treating compromises as “losses” equivalent to the other party winning. Further, we predict that a winning outcome will induce partisan bias in people’s view of what comprises a bipartisan outcome. Additionally, being on the winning side may also enhance the partisan divide in preferences. Finally, we hypothesize that the perceived bipartisanship of one’s own party leader is less sensitive to the nature of the outcome compared to the perceived bipartisanship of the opposing party’s leader. In other words, when evaluating the other party’s actions, people may not give credit to the other leader for being bipartisan, yet evaluate the other leader very poorly for standing his or her ground. On the other hand, when evaluating one’s own leader, people may be more forgiving and less sensitive to hardline actions. This expectation is consistent with literature on motivated reasoning which has found that partisans punish presidents of the opposite party for economic performance but their evaluations of a president of their own party are not sensitive to economic indicators ([Lebo and Cassino 2007](#_ENREF_46)).

 *Measures*. We predict six dependent variables. First, as a manipulation check, respondents were asked to assess how bipartisan they perceived the outcome of the negotiations: “How ‘bipartisan’ is the negotiated NASA budget?” (response options: “extremely bipartisan,” “very bipartisan,” “somewhat bipartisan,” “slightly bipartisan,” “not bipartisan at all”). Second, we measured support for the negotiated budget: “Would you say that you generally favor or oppose the negotiated NASA budget?” (response options: “strongly favor,” “somewhat favor,” “somewhat oppose,” “strongly oppose”). The third and fourth dependent variables are measured using “sliders” provided to respondents to select the level of cuts (between $200 million and $400 million) that they consider “bipartisan” and that reflects their ideal outcome. [[9]](#footnote-9) We created dummy variables indicating whether the respondent moved the slider toward their party’s side away from the $300 million split (i.e., toward $200 million for Democrats and toward $400 million for Republicans) in reporting: (1) what they thought was a bipartisan outcome; and (2) their preferred outcome. We also asked respondents to assess the behavior of each of the parties and its leaders: “To what extent did Speaker Boehner and the Republicans behave in a bipartisan fashion during the negotiations?” and “To what extent did President Obama and the Democrats behave in a bipartisan fashion during the negotiations?” (response options: “extremely bipartisan,” “very bipartisan,” “somewhat bipartisan,” “slightly bipartisan,” “not bipartisan at all”). When predicting attitudes towards the leaders involved in the negotiation, we recode the treatment dummies to represent whether the leader conceded his party’s position, agreed to a bipartisan split, or stood firm for his party’s position.

In both this study and the second one, we recode each dependent variable to lie between 0 and 1 so that a regression coefficient can be easily interpreted as producing a 100*β* percentage point change in the dependent variable from going from the lowest to highest point of the independent variable.

 *Results*. We estimated OLS regressions predicting our dependent variables of interest with dummy variables representing the own party win and bipartisan treatments discussed above (the “opposing party win” condition was set as the baseline category). Given that the dependent variables are rating scales, we also estimated identical versions of the models using ordered logistic regression and obtained similar results (see Online Appendix 3). We present results from OLS regressions here for ease of presentation and interpretability.

Confirming that our manipulation was successful, the equitable compromise outcome is perceived as 12.5 percentage points more bipartisan than the outcome where the opposing party wins (*p* < .001)[[10]](#footnote-10) and 8.5 percentage points more bipartisan than the outcome where one’s own party emerges victorious (*p* < .001) (see column one of Table 1; full sample results in Figure 1(a)).[[11]](#footnote-11) Interestingly, respondents perceive the outcome where their own party succeeds in the negotiations as 3.9 percentage points more bipartisan than when the budget is closer to the opposing party’s position (*p* = .03). Hence, like Mourdock, it appears as if people believe it is more bipartisan for the other side to come to one’s own position than vice versa. As shown in the second column of Table 1, the effects of the treatments on the perceived bipartisanship of the legislation did not significantly vary according to respondents’ abstract conceptions of bipartisanship (i.e., the interaction terms between the treatment dummies and the bipartisanship measure are insignificant). In terms of the direction of the effects, Figure 1(a) shows that bipartisan respondents were more likely to think that the “bipartisan split” outcome was bipartisan and less likely to view the “own party wins” outcome that way.

 As shown in the third column of Table 1 and Figure 1(b), respondents were 3.7 percentage points more supportive of legislation when the negotiated budget was closer to their own party’s position compared to it being closer to the opposing party’s position (*p* = .07). Conversely, respondents exhibited substantively and significantly similar support when comparing the bipartisan budget to the budget outcome closer to the opposing party (1.1 percentage points, *p* = .59). This suggests that even though they viewed an even compromise as bipartisan, people equate an even compromise to a “loss” while they perceive an outcome where their side budges very little as a “win.” Because people equate bipartisan legislation to legislation passed when their party loses, leaders are incentivized to stand firm in negotiations. As shown in the fourth column of the Table 1, the treatment effects were not significantly conditioned by respondents’ abstract views of bipartisanship. Therefore, the results are not just driven by partisan respondents with no desire to reach across the aisle. Although the estimates are less precise due to smaller sample sizes in subgroups of the data, Figure 1(b) illustrates that bipartisan individuals exhibited an overall pattern quite similar to the full sample.

 Observing one’s own side winning also changes people’s views of what they consider to be bipartisan. In the fifth column of Table 1, we present a regression predicting whether the respondent viewed an outcome closer to their own party’s position (and not the $300 million even split) as the bipartisan outcome. Compared to the other party emerging victorious, seeing the outcome come nearer to one’s own party increases the likelihood of pulling the slider towards your party’s position by 13.4 percentage points (*p* < .001) (see Figure 1(c)). Further, compared to the even split condition, respondents in the “own party” win group were 9.4% more likely to believe that a bipartisan outcome was one biased toward their own party (*p* = .007). Conversely, observing a bipartisan split is no different than seeing the other party win (4.1 percentage points, *p* = .24). Consequently, people are more likely to exhibit partisan bias in what they perceive to be bipartisan after seeing their party representatives not concede in negotiations. As seen in the sixth column, these effects are, if anything, stronger among those expressing an abstract support for bipartisanship. As shown in Figure 1(c), while learning that one’s own party won only shifted perceptions of what a bipartisan outcome was by 0.9% among partisan respondents, the treatment effect was 16.7% among bipartisan respondents (the difference of 15.8% is significant at *p* = .057). One possible reason why bipartisan respondents exhibited the strongest treatment effects is because partisan respondents are already predisposed to think that the group-serving outcome is bipartisan. These results suggest that observing partisan acrimony may actually lead people who were predisposed to be bipartisan to take more conflicting stances.

The outcomes of the negotiations also influenced preferences on the budget cuts themselves. In the seventh column of Table 1, we predict whether the respondent pulled the slider toward her own party’s position when reporting her preferred outcome. Observing one’s own party emerge victorious from the negotiations increases partisan bias in the preferred outcome by 6.7 percentage points over the “other party wins” condition (*p* = .07) and by 7.6 percentage point over the bipartisan split condition (*p* = .045) (see Figure 1(d)). There was no significant difference between the “other party wins” and bipartisan split conditions (0.9 percentage points, *p* = .82). Thus, partisan polarization over issues is exacerbated by party leaders standing firm in their positions. As shown in the final column of Table 1, we again see that bipartisan respondents are the ones driving this relationship. As illustrated in Figure 1(d), learning that one’s own party won actually caused partisans to be 10.2% *less* likely to pull the slider towards them, compared to an 11.2% *increase* among bipartisan respondents (difference of 21.4% significant at *p* = .02).

 When evaluating the other party’s leader, respondents are sensitive to outcomes they perceive as unfair. As shown in the first column of Table 2 and Figure 2(a), respondents evaluate the leader as a substantively large 8.1 percentage points less bipartisan if the opposing party stands firm compared to the leader conceding in the negotiation (*p* < .001). Similarly, they evaluate the opposing leader as 11.1 percentage points less bipartisan when he stands firm compared to achieving an even split (*p* < .001). On the other hand, the leader earns no significant reward in terms of a bipartisan evaluation for producing a bipartisan split relative to an outcome where the leader concedes (*p* = .15). Hence, people think that opposing leaders are partisan when they move outcomes to their side but believe they are bipartisan when the outcome is closer to the respondents’ own position (and the opposing leader made medium to large compromises).

 A different picture emerges when examining how people evaluate their own party’s leader. As shown in the third column of Table 2 and Figure 2(b), the effects of the treatments are smaller, suggesting less sensitivity to the leader’s actions. Respondents evaluate the leader as only 3.5 percentage points more bipartisan if one’s own party concedes the negotiation compared to the leader standing firm (*p* = .06). On the other hand, in the equitable compromise condition, the leader is perceived as being more bipartisan compared to the leader standing firm (6.9 percentage points, *p* < .001) and to the leader conceding (3.3 percentage points, *p* = .09). Hence, people do not perceive their own leaders as particularly partisan when they move outcomes to their side and are more willing to describe their own leaders as bipartisan when they make compromises. Thus, to be considered “bipartisan,” a leader in your own party could compromise to the middle but no further, whereas a leader in the other party might as well come all the way over to your own side.

 As shown in the second and fourth columns of Table 2, this overall pattern is similar among bipartisan respondents, although they are more sensitive to the treatment information for both sets of leaders. Nonetheless, the increased sensitivity of the outcomes to views of the other party’s leader’s bipartisanship appears among bipartisan respondents as well, as seen when comparing the magnitude of the treatment effects between the top and bottom panels (see Figure 2 (a) and (b)).

**Study 2**

*Design*. In contrast to Study 1, which highlighted the compromises made by each side, Study 2 focused on the makeup of the supporting coalition. By varying the composition of support rather than the compromises made to get there (and the resulting picture of the outcome as a win or a loss), this experiment offers a seemingly easy case for bipartisanship to be the desired outcome. We asked respondents to evaluate a piece of legislation that makes it easier for small businesses to obtain loans:

Recently, the U.S. Senate considered the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which funded tax cuts to small businesses and made it easier for them to obtain loans.

There are 100 members of the U.S. Senate, 53 Democrats and 47 Republicans. 46 Democrats and 46 Republicans voted on the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010.

The bill passed on a vote of [X]. [Y1] Democrats voted for the bill and [Y2] Democrats voted against it. [Z1] Republicans voted for the bill and [Z2] Republicans voted against it.

We randomly assigned respondents to one of six conditions where we vary the composition of the coalition supporting the bill, both in terms of overall support (X), and the numbers of Democrats and Republicans voting for and against the bill (Y1/Y2; Z1/Z2):

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Condition: | X (Vote): | Y1 (Dem. yea): | Y2 (Dem. nea): | Z1 (Rep. yea): | Z2 (Rep. nea): |
| Republican Dominated, Supermajority | 68-24 | 22 | 24 | 46 | 0 |
| Democratic Dominated, Supermajority | 68-24 | 46 | 0 | 22 | 24 |
| Bipartisan, Supermajority | 68-24 | 34 | 12 | 34 | 12 |
| Republican Dominated, Split | 46-46 | 0 | 46 | 46 | 0 |
| Democratic Dominated, Split | 46-46 | 46 | 0 | 0 | 46 |
| Bipartisan, Split | 46-46 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 |

This effectively represents a 2x3 experimental design where we manipulate: (1) whether the coalition is split (46-46) or comprises a supermajority (68-24); and (2) whether the coalition is dominated by Democrats, Republicans, or cuts across party lines. Hence, we can alter the composition of the coalition while holding the size of the coalition fixed, eliminating the confound that often bipartisan coalitions are characterized by more popular support overall. We recode the second set of treatment conditions based on the respondent’s party identification: (1) “own-party dominated” (i.e. Republicans in the “Republican Dominated” conditions and Democrats in the “Democrat Dominated” conditions); (2) “other-party dominated” (i.e. Republicans in the “Democratic Dominated” conditions and Democrats in the “Republican Dominated” conditions); and (3) bipartisan. In addition to the manipulations described above, we also independently randomized whether Democrats’ votes were presented before Republicans’ votes, and whether yea votes were presented before nay votes.

 Often when learning about a piece of passed legislation, people receive little information about the substance, and even less about the compromises that were made to reach a legislative outcome, but do learn about the composition of the coalition that passed it. Our experimental design attempts to capture this feature: people received relatively little information about the policy’s content and some information (in the form of a cue) about who supported it. By examining how respondents react to coalitions as cues, we can make inferences about how rational lawmakers, anticipating constituent responses, would aim to construct a winning coalition.

 *Hypotheses*. For both the split and supermajority coalitions, we analyze whether respondents prefer the coalition primarily made up of their own party’s supporters to the coalition that comprises both parties (assuming the coalition dominated by the other partly is strictly less preferred). On the one hand, the structure of the coalition may be purely interpreted by citizens as a party cue, activating partisan social identities and/or information about the policy. Consequently, Democratic/Republican respondents may be more likely to support the bill when they observe more Democratic/Republican members supporting the bill. They would combine the information from the partisan composition of the coalition with their prior support for the policy content to form an overall preference. The alternative hypothesis is that all respondents—regardless of partisanship—are more supportive of the legislation when it is bipartisan. This experimental design allows us to test whether respondents actually do prefer bipartisan coalitions when tied to specific policies (as opposed to just expressing support for an abstract notion of bipartisanship). Or, party cues and bipartisan coalitions may have similar, positive effects on policy support. However, if citizens either react strongly to coalitions as party cues or fail to provide higher levels of support for bipartisan coalitions, then party leaders may not be incentivized to expend costs to work with the other side to construct bipartisan coalitions

*Measures*. As a manipulation check, we asked respondents: “How ‘bipartisan’ is the proposed legislation?” (response options: “extremely bipartisan,” “very bipartisan,” “somewhat bipartisan,” “slightly bipartisan,” “not bipartisan at all”). We would expect the bipartisan coalitions to be perceived as more bipartisan than both the “own party dominated” and “other party dominated” coalitions. To measure support for the small business loan policy, we asked respondents: “Would you say that you generally favor or oppose this legislation?” (response options: “strongly favor,” “somewhat favor,” “somewhat oppose,” “strongly oppose”).

 *Results*. We estimated OLS regressions predicting our dependent variables of interest with dummy variables representing the six treatment conditions described above (the “opposing party dominated, split coalition” was set as the baseline category). As in Study 1, ordered logistic regression models are presented in Online Appendix 3.

 As shown in the first column of Table 3 and Figures 3(a) and 3(c), respondents correctly understood the manipulations. In the split coalition conditions, the bipartisan coalition was perceived as being 12 percentage points more “bipartisan” than the opposing party dominated coalition (*p* < .001) and 7 percentage points more “bipartisan” than the own party dominated coalition (*p* = .02). Similarly, in the supermajority conditions, respondents perceived the legislation produced by the bipartisan coalition to be 12 percentage points more “bipartisan” than the opposing party dominated coalition (*p* < .001) and 8 percentage points more “bipartisan” than the own party dominated coalition (*p* = .009). As shown in the second column of Table 3 and Figure 3(a) and (c), none of the interaction terms between abstract bipartisanship and the treatment conditions achieves standard levels of statistically significance, meaning that bipartisan and partisan respondents respond to the treatment information in similar ways.

 Despite accurately identifying truly bipartisan coalitions, we nonetheless find that respondents do not prefer legislation produced by the bipartisan coalitions to the own-party coalitions, suggesting that leaders gain little benefit from working with the other side to build support for legislation. As shown in the second column of Table 3 and Figures 3(b) and 3(d), in the split coalition, there is absolutely no difference in support between the “own party” and “bipartisan” coalitions (0.0 percentage points, *p* = .97). Similarly, in the supermajority coalitions, the support levels for the “own party” and “bipartisan” coalitions are nearly identical; the difference is a substantively small 1.5 percentage points (*p* = .56). Unsurprisingly, under both types of coalitions, legislation produced by an opposite party dominated coalition is significantly less popular. Thus, we find that no matter whether coalitions are minimum winning coalitions or supermajorities, people do not provide extra support for bipartisan legislation, in contrast to their more abstract preference for bipartisanship exhibited in public opinion surveys. Whatever beneficial aspects citizens perceive in bipartisan legislation do not seem to outweigh the benefits—perhaps via the signaling of party cues—of legislation passed with coalitions dominated by one’s own party.

We observe similar patterns when looking at those respondents classified as bipartisan and partisan according to responses to the abstract question. The fully specified regression model in column four is difficult to interpret, so we focus on the visual presentation of the treatment effects in Figure 3(b) and (d). Like the full set of respondents, bipartisan respondents are not especially supportive of legislation passed with a bipartisan coalition (compared to that passed with a partisan coalition). In the case of the split coalition, bipartisan respondents exhibit 2.7% greater support for the bipartisan legislation, a statistically insignificant difference (*p* = .34). For legislation passed with a supermajority, the effect is signed in the reverse direction with the partisan legislation exhibiting 2.1% greater support but this difference is also not significant (*p* = .42).

**Discussion**

The results of these studies highlight two important features of the relationship between mass preferences and partisan conflict in Congress. First, we demonstrate that contrary to expectations from much of the literature, voters do not express any special preference for bipartisan coalitions, preferring them as much or less than coalitions dominated by their own party. When the content of the compromise is clear, as in Study 1, partisan outcomes are strictly preferred. Support for the bipartisan coalition and the coalition dominated by one’s own party received statistically similar support in Study 2. The difference in the results between Study 1 and Study 2 may reflect what respondents were told about the relationship between compromise and bipartisanship. In Study 1, both the positions of the two parties and the degree of compromise by each in the outcome is clear. Thus, partisan losses are evident, even in a truly bipartisan outcome. In contrast, respondents in Study 2 were not told whether or how the legislation moved away from partisan positions when garnering a bipartisan coalition. If this intuition is correct, then efforts by elected representatives to highlight their positions and the degree of compromise sought by the opposing side are likely to dampen support for bipartisanship among co-partisans. This may help explain efforts by some Republicans to create the appearance of partisan conflict on immigration reform ([Sarlin 2013](#_ENREF_65)).

Second, we show that voters’ perceptions of bipartisanship reflect partisan biases, both in outcomes and in the evaluations of political leaders. In Study 1, respondents perceive outcomes closer to their own party’s position as more bipartisan than compromises that provide a win for the opposing side, and observing a win by one’s own party skews subsequent perceptions of bipartisan outcomes and even preferred policies. Further, voters’ perceptions of their own party’s leaders are generally less sensitive to inequitable compromises while their perceptions of the other party’s leaders are highly sensitive. Combined, these results suggest that when partisan conflict and a win for your side is an option, bipartisanship is not the preferred outcome despite generic claims for more bipartisanship and compromise. These findings are consistent with our theoretical framework that emphasized that while abstract conceptions of bipartisanship have positive valence, specific instances of compromise activate partisan social identities.

Turning from the experimental results to considerations of external validity, in many ways we provided what should have been the best case scenarios for observing support for bipartisanship. For instance, in Study 2 we examined a broadly popular proposal that cut across partisan lines. In Study 1, we provided an example where both parties want to move policy in the same direction⎯cutting NASA spending. If bipartisan compromises are not preferred, even when the direction of policy change is similar for both sides, it is unlikely that bipartisanship and compromise will be preferred on issues where the parties want to move policy in opposing directions. In addition, these were relatively low salience issues that have not received substantial attention by the media or by candidates during campaigns, both factors that could make bipartisanship even less preferred for more contentious issues.

Future research on this topic should vary the stakes of political compromise, both by comparing more and less salient issues as well as by altering what happens if a compromise is not reached. In the studies reported here, agreement was assumed to have already occurred. Perhaps compromise is desired more when the alternative is policy gridlock (especially on a highly salient policy) than when the alternative is a win by your party or when no alternative is specified. Although the question wordings differ across surveys, in the polls discussed in the introduction preferences for bipartisanship were not markedly higher for questions that mentioned the consequences of gridlock. Nonetheless, considering how people react to alternatives to compromise is a fruitful avenue for subsequent scholarship. It is important to remember, however, that obstructionism by congressional parties and policy gridlock did not result in shifts in party control in the 2012 elections, as may have been expected if voters valued bipartisan compromises over partisan position taking.

 When combined with the broader electoral and policy incentives for members to engage in partisanship, these findings suggest that not only is partisan discord in Congress likely but it is consistent with representation of co-partisans. As other scholars have noted, partisans, and especially strong partisans, are the segment of the public that is most likely to vote and to be politically engaged ([Abramowitz 2010](#_ENREF_1)). With districts that skew toward one party ([Theriault 2008](#_ENREF_75)), the interests of co-partisans are likely to dominate in both the primary and general elections. Thus, the preferences of a member’s constituents further disincentivize bipartisanship rather than work against the numerous other incentives members have to engage in partisan behavior⎯heading off primary challengers, raising money, gaining interest group support, and differentiating their party in order to fight for majority status, just to name a few. Moreover, our results raise questions about whether majority parties will be rewarded or punished for pursing partisan policies. As noted by Adler and Wilkerson ([2013](#_ENREF_2)), lawmakers believe that voters value problem solving in governing; as a result, elected officials care about addressing the needs of the country and passing legislation. However, if legislation with partisan coalitions is easier to pursue than bipartisan coalitions and there is no bonus in support for creating a bipartisan coalition, partisan problem solving is the likely outcome. Beyond better understanding the basis of partisan conflict in government and whether it raises concerns about democratic failures, especially for representation, understanding public preferences over this politically consequential issue has important implications for scholarly theories and models of elite behavior. Having a more nuanced view of public preferences for moderation, compromise, and bipartisanship can help us better understand the motivations of political leaders and the outcomes that occur when the public is an important audience or actor.

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| **Table 1: Results of Study 1, The Effect of the Outcomes of Negotiation** |
|  | Perceived Bipartisanship |  | Support for Legislation |  | Partisan Bias in Perceived Bipartisan Outcome |  | Partisan Bias in Preferred Outcome |
| Own Party Wins  | .039\*(.018) | .067+(.039) |  | .037+(.020) | .080+(.044) |  | .134\*\*(.034) | .009(.074) |  | .067+(.037) | -.102(.080) |
| Bipartisan Split | .125\*\*(.018) | .088\*(.041) |  | .011(.021) | .007(.046) |  | .041(.035) | .032(.077) |  | -.009(.038) | .000(.084) |
| Abstract Bipartisanship | ⎯⎯ | .022(.032) |  | ⎯⎯ | .100\*\*(.032) |  | ⎯⎯ | -.183\*\*(.060) |  | ⎯⎯ | -.163\*(.066) |
| Own Party Wins x Abstract Bipartisanship | ⎯⎯ | -.035(.044) |  | ⎯⎯ | -.048(.050) |  | ⎯⎯ | .158+(.083) |  | ⎯⎯ | .214\*(.091) |
| Bipartisan Split x Abstract Bipartisanship | ⎯⎯ | .050(.046) |  | ⎯⎯ | .010(.052) |  | ⎯⎯ | .009(.086) |  | ⎯⎯ | -.016(.094) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | .375\*\*(.013) | .357\*\*(.029) |  | .592\*\*(.014) | .510\*\*(.033) |  | .221\*\*(.024) | .368\*\*(.054) |  | .382\*\*(.026) | .515\*\*(.059) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| N | 1025 | 1013 |  | 1036 | 1024 |  | 1011 | 1002 |  | 1019 | 1009 |
| R2 |  .04 | .05 |  | .00 | .02 |  | .02 | .03 |  | .01 | .02 |
| Note: OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is “Other Party Wins.” \*\**p*<.01; \**p*<.05; +*p*<.10 (two-tailed) |

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| **Table 2: Results of Study 1, The Effect of the Outcomes of Negotiation (Leader Evaluations)** |
|  | Other Leader’s Bipartisanship  |  | Own Leader’s Bipartisanship |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Leader Concedes  | .081\*\*(.020) | .021(.045) |  | .035+(.019) | -.043(.041) |
| Leader Splits | .111\*\*(.021) | .042(.046) |  | .069\*\*(.019) | -.006(.041) |
| Abstract Bipartisanship | ⎯⎯ | -.028(.037) |  | ⎯⎯ | -.032(.032) |
| Leader Concedes x Abstract Bipartisanship | ⎯⎯ | .081(.050) |  | ⎯⎯ | .100\*(.046) |
| Leader Splits x Abstract Bipartisanship | ⎯⎯ | .090+(.052) |  | ⎯⎯ | .093\*(.047) |
| Constant | .343\*\*(.014) | .364\*\*(.033) |  | .427\*\*(.013) | .454\*\*(.028) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| N | 1018 | 1007 |  | 1015 | 1004 |
| R2 | .03 | .04 |  | .01 | .02 |
| Note: OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is “Leader Stands Firm.”\*\**p*<.01; \**p*<.05; +*p*<.10 (two-tailed) |

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| **Table 3: Results of Study 2, The Effect of the Composition of the Coalition** |
|  | Perceived Bipartisanship |  | Support for Legislation |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Own Party Dominated, Supermajority  | .099\*\*(.030) | .123+(.067) |  | .172\*\*(.026) | .276\*\*(.057) |
| Bipartisan, Supermajority | .175\*\*(.029) | .132\*(.067) |  | .158\*\*(.025) | .266\*\*(.057) |
| Opposing Party Dominated, Supermajority | .063\*(.031) | .081(.063) |  | .080\*\*(.027) | .138\*(.054) |
| Own Party Dominated, Split  | .047(.030) | .084(.064) |  | .105\*\*(.026) | .244\*\*(.054) |
| Bipartisan, Split | .117\*\*(.029) | .109(.068) |  | .106\*\*(.026) | .110+(.058) |
| Abstract Bipartisanship | ⎯⎯ | .090+(.053) |  | ⎯⎯ | .202\*\*(.045) |
| Abstract Bipartisanship xOwn Party Dominated, Supermajority  | ⎯⎯ | -.026(.075) |  | ⎯⎯ | -.124+(.064) |
| Abstract Bipartisanship xBipartisan, Supermajority | ⎯⎯ | .054(.074) |  | ⎯⎯ | -.135\*(.063) |
| Abstract Bipartisanship xOpposing Party Dominated, Supermajority | ⎯⎯ | -.013(.073) |  | ⎯⎯ | -.055(.062) |
| Abstract Bipartisanship xOwn Party Dominated, Split  | ⎯⎯ | -.042(.073) |  | ⎯⎯ | -.170\*\*(.062) |
| Abstract Bipartisanship xBipartisan, Split | ⎯⎯ | .008(.076) |  | ⎯⎯ | -.009(.064) |
| Constant | .368\*\*(.021) | .294\*\*(.047) |  | .554\*\*(.018) | .390\*\*(.040) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| N | 1020 | 1007 |  | 1030 | 1019 |
| R2 | .04 | .06 |  | .05 | .10 |
| Note: OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables recoded to lie between 0 and 1. Omitted category represented by the constant is “Opposing Party Dominated, Split.”\*\**p*<.01; \**p*<.05; +*p*<.10 (two-tailed) |

**Figure 1: Treatment Effects in Study 1, The Effect of the Outcomes of Negotiation**

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Note: The y-axis represents the difference between the “Own Party Wins”/“Bipartisan” group and the “Opposing Party Wins” group for each dependent variable. 90% confidence intervals are included around the estimate.

**Figure 2: Treatment Effects in Study 1, The Effect of the Outcomes of Negotiation (Leader Evaluations)**



Note: The y-axis represents the difference between the “Leader Concedes”/“Leader Splits” group and the “Leader Stands Firm” group for each dependent variable. 90% confidence intervals are included around the estimate.

**Figure 3: Treatment Effects in Study 2, The Effect of the Composition of the Coalition**



Note: The y-axis represents the difference between the “Own Party Dominated”/“Bipartisan” group and the “Opposing Party Dominated” group for each dependent variable. 90% confidence intervals are included around the estimate.

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| **Appendix A: Randomization Checks for Study 1** |
|  | Bipartisan Split | Dem Win | Rep Win |
| Gender |  |  |  |
| Female | 45.37% | 46.44% | 47.47% |
| Male | 54.63 | 53.56 | 52.53 |
| χ2(2) = 0.3, *p*=.86 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Race |  |  |  |
| Nonwhite | 25.93 | 27.70 | 23.60 |
| White | 74.07 | 72.30 | 76.40 |
| χ2(2) = 1.6, *p*=.44 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Education |  |  |  |
| Less HS | 8.64 | 10.03 | 7.02 |
| High School | 30.25 | 32.45 | 28.37 |
| Some College | 28.40 | 28.50 | 30.90 |
| Bachelors or higher | 32.72 | 29.02 | 33.71 |
| χ2(6) = 4.8, *p*=.57 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Party Identification |  |  |  |
| Strong Democrat | 21.60 | 17.77 | 19.10 |
| Weak Democrat | 17.28 | 18.30 | 14.04 |
| Independent | 35.19 | 33.16 | 32.02 |
| Weak Republican | 12.35 | 14.32 | 19.38 |
| Strong Republican | 13.8 | 16.45 | 15.45 |
| χ2(8) = 10.9, *p*=.21 |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Age |  |  |  |
| 18-29 | 15.74 | 18.73 | 14.89 |
| 30-44 | 27.16 | 21.64 | 22.47 |
| 45-59 | 29.63 | 30.34 | 31.46 |
| 60+ | 27.47 | 29.29 | 21.18 |
| χ2(6) = 5.4, *p*=.50 |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| N | 324 | 377 | 356 |

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| **Appendix B: Randomization Checks for Study 2** |
|  | 68-24 Bipartisan | 68-24 Dem | 68-24 Rep | 46-46 Bipartisan | 46-46 Dem | 46-46 Rep |
| Gender |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 46.96% | 47.13% | 46.59% | 44.62% | 50.00% | 45.16% |
| Male | 54.04 | 52.87 | 53.41 | 55.38 | 50.00 | 54.84 |
| χ2(5) = 1.2, *p*=.94 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Race |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Nonwhite | 27.27 | 27.39 | 28.41 | 26.88 | 24.36 | 20.43 |
| White | 72.73 | 72.61 | 71.59 | 73.12 | 75.64 | 79.57 |
| χ2(5) = 4.1, *p*=.53 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Less HS | 5.56 | 7.01 | 11.93 | 6.45 | 13.46 | 8.06 |
| High School | 32.32 | 21.35 | 31.2 | 24.19 | 32.05 | 31.18 |
| Some College | 29.80 | 30.57 | 25.57 | 33.33 | 23.72 | 21.72 |
| Bachelors or higher | 32.32 | 30.57 | 31.25 | 36.02 | 30.77 | 29.03 |
| χ2(15) = 18.8, *p*=.22 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Party Identification |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Strong Democrat | 12.63 | 22.44 | 19.32 | 20.97 | 20.51 | 21.62 |
| Weak Democrat | 18.18 | 16.67 | 15.34 | 13.98 | 19.23 | 16.22 |
| Independent | 34.85 | 33.97 | 35.80 | 37.10 | 26.92 | 30.81 |
| Weak Republican | 17.68 | 12.82 | 18.18 | 13.44 | 15.38 | 14.59 |
| Strong Republican | 16.67 | 14.10 | 11.36 | 14.42 | 17.95 | 16.76 |
| χ2(20) = 17.7, *p*=.61 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 18-29 | 17.68 | 15.92 | 14.20 | 20.97 | 19.87 | 10.75 |
| 30-44 | 23.23 | 26.11 | 26.70 | 20.43 | 23.08 | 22.58 |
| 45-59 | 32.83 | 28.66 | 28.98 | 28.49 | 30.77 | 32.80 |
| 60+ | 26.26 | 29.30 | 30.11 | 30.11 | 26.28 | 33.87 |
| χ2(15) = 13.6, *p*=.56 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| N | 198 | 156 | 176 | 186 | 156 | 185 |

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2. For instance, Groseclose and McCarty ([2001](#_ENREF_33)) assume that the public punishes political leaders for appearing extreme and unwilling to compromise during bargaining. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. These results are not atypical. A CBS News Poll ([2011](#_ENREF_18)) found that about 80% of respondents preferred that President Obama, the Democrats in Congress, and the Republicans in Congress compromise some of their positions to pass a budget. Similarly, a 2011 poll conducted by Pew Research found that 68% of respondents reported wanting lawmakers being “willing to compromise, even if it means they strike a deal you disagree with” in the context of the debt ceiling negotiations ([Pew 2011](#_ENREF_59)). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. This distinction between abstract and specificity in bipartisanship is also evident in responses to comments and speeches by political elites. Like many other presidents, Barack Obama’s 2012 inaugural address touched on opportunities for bipartisan agreement. But as Senator Rob Portman commented, he did not offer specifics on what that would look like. “My disappointment was that in the speech, I think the president missed an opportunity to talk about where we can find common ground. Instead, he chose to talk about it in the abstract⎯and the specifics were about the things he believes, but are not issues where we, as a Congress and an executive branch, can make progress” ([Beamon 2013](#_ENREF_9)). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. In order to isolate key features of the negotiation or the coalition in the treatment conditions, we included deceptive information in the blurbs given to respondents. At the end of the survey, respondents were provided with a debriefing script that noted this information and provided them with links if they wanted to read more about a particular policy. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Pure independents were dropped since the analysis focuses on treatments specific to a respondent’s own party or the opposing party. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Due to the randomization of the order of the questions on the questionnaire, sometimes this question preceded the treatment information and sometimes it followed it. A concern with asking the question before the presentation of the treatment information is that asking about bipartisanship might prime respondents’ response to the treatment. A concern with asking the question after the presentation of the treatment is that if the treatment affects responses to the question, then conditioning on the abstract bipartisanship variable would be akin to controlling for an endogenous variable. The results presented below are not affected by whether this question was asked before or after the treatment information. Additionally, in the cases where the treatments preceded the question, there were no significant treatment effects on general conceptions of bipartisanship in both studies, alleviating concerns associated with conditioning on a post-treatment variable. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. One rational for partisan differences comes from studies by the Pew Research Center. They have found that Democrats have been more likely to prefer compromise than Republicans since 1987 (77% to 66%), with a growing gap over time (90% to 68% in 2012) ([Pew 2012](#_ENREF_60)). This raises the possibility of differential preferences by party, even though majorities of both parties express a desire for compromise by political leaders. However, interactions terms between the treatments and party identification are generally insignificant. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. We first asked respondents “How much of a cut to NASA’s budget would you consider to be a “bipartisan” outcome?” and asked them to move the slider below to make their choice.  The dollar value they selected could be seen in a text box below. The second question asked respondents, “If you had to choose, how much would you cut NASA’s budget?” An identical slider was provided for this question. The slider was initially set at $300 million. Respondents who did not move the slider and selected $300 million were given a follow-up question asking if they meant to answer $300 million, if they would like to re-answer the question, or if they wished not to provide a response. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. All significance tests reported are two-tailed. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. The goal here is not to explain a great portion of variance in the dependent variables, but rather to assess the unbiased, causal effects of the treatments. Therefore, the r-squared figures in the statistical models are essentially irrelevant. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)