

THE EXPRESSION OF BIOLOGICAL CONCEPTS OF RACE¹

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ABSTRACT

In recent years, dramatic developments in genetics research have begun to transform not only the practice of medicine but also conceptions of the social world. In the media, in popular culture, and in everyday conversation, Americans routinely link genetics to individual behavior and social outcomes. On the other hand, social researchers contend that biological definitions of race have lost ground in the United States over the last 50 years. At the crossroads of two trends—on one hand, the post-World War II recoil from biological accounts of racial difference, and on the other, the growing admiration for the advances of genetic science—the American public's conception of race is a phenomenon that merits greater attention from sociologists than it has received to date. However, survey data on racial attitudes has proven to be significantly affected by social desirability bias. While a number of studies have attempted to measure social desirability bias with regard to racial attitudes, most have focused on racial policy preferences rather than genetic accounts of racial inequality. We employ a list experiment to create an unobtrusive measure of support for a biologicistic understanding of racial inequality. We show that one in five non-black Americans attribute income inequality between black and white people to unspecified genetic differences between the two groups. We also find that this number is substantially underestimated when using a direct question. The magnitude of social desirability effects varies, and is most pronounced among women, older people, and the highly-educated.

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, dramatic developments in genetics research—such as the course of events leading up to the decoding of the human genome and the new directions in bioscientific investigation this historic event subsequently made possible—have begun to transform not only the practice of medicine but also conceptions of the social world, from human nature to human interrelatedness (Condit 1999; Jayaratne nd; Kevles and Hood 1992; Nelkin and Lindee 1995). Genetics has captured the public imagination in myriad ways; in the media, in popular culture, and in everyday conversation, Americans routinely link genetics to individual behavior and social outcomes (Nelkin and Lindee 1995). Lippman argues that recent developments have ushered in the “geneticization” of increasing spheres of social life, “with most disorders, behaviors and physiological variations defined, at least in part, as genetic in origin” (1991).

Confirming this observation, in new research by Jayaratne and collaborators, survey respondents associated social inequality with genetics (2002). The historical record demonstrates that essentialist, biological concepts of race—as well as other social categories—have at times justified inequality and prejudice (Jones 1993; Graves 2003; Wailoo 1999). As Wailoo details, the genetic disease sickle cell anemia has been used to “endorse social order and lines of segregation in America” (1999:254) such that it became a justification, in some quarters, for anti-miscegenation laws. Although Duster (1990) presciently cautioned that genetics research proceeding from *a priori* assumptions of human difference might contribute to the production of biologically-based categories of social stratification anew, the extent to which contemporary genetic determinism has permeated ideas about race in particular is only beginning to be established (Jayaratne; Lee, Mountain and Koenig 2001).

Several prominent social researchers contend that biological definitions of race have lost ground in the United States over the last 50 years (Bobo, Kluegel and Smith 1997; Schuman et al. 1997). According to Bobo, Kluegel and Smith, the overt anti-black “Jim Crow racism” that distinguished early twentieth-century white racial attitudes gave way, by the century’s close, to a more covert “laissez-faire racism,” characterized in part by a decline in support for biological theories of race (1997; Bobo 2001; GSS 1977-2002). Apostle, Glock, Piazza, and Suelzle concluded that American society was “well past the era in which genetic explanations [of racial difference] were dominant” (1983: 229). Social scientists have attributed the downward trend in explicit anti-black attitudes among whites to a shift from biologically-based explanations for African Americans’

socioeconomic status to volitional and cultural explanations (Bobo, Kluegel and Smith 1997). Less explored is the fact that this change in public opinion owed in part to a concerted effort by social scientists and some scientists to debunk biological theories of racial difference in the aftermath of the atrocities of World War II (Barkan 1992; Stepan 1982), which culminated in the UNESCO Statement on Race of 1950 that concluded “there is no biological reality to the concept of race” (UNESCO 1952:7). This “cultural turn” in race-thinking was bolstered, and to some extent authorized, by new developments in human population genetics (Cavalli-Sforza and Bodmer 1971; Reardon 2004).

At present, scientific thinking on race—and the effect of these ideas on racial attitudes—is less definitive. Some scholars have argued that race never lost its currency in the sciences, just its acceptability (Cooper 2003; Reardon 2004). Cooper, for example, likens the most recent association of race and genetics among scientists to “new wine in old bottles” (23). Others suggest that biological thinking about race is having a resurgence (Lee, Mountain and Koenig 2001; Morning 2004). Morning (2004) found that after a mid-twentieth century decline, there has been a steady increase in the use of biological notions of race in science textbooks. Similarly, Lee, Mountain and Koenig argue that a renaissance in biological conceptions of racial difference has emerged concurrent with the development of genomics; the authors caution that the parsing of groups by race, even for the well-intentioned, if unproven, purpose of eliminating health disparities, may lead to the “reification of race,” and in turn, produce stigmatization and discrimination (2001:37). Whether these ideas are the product of old scientific thinking or new scientific techniques, and regardless of how they have waxed or waned in the last several decades, their proliferation in the media combined with recent advances in genetics may be producing a new public consensus about the social implications of race and heredity (Condit et al. 2004). As well, these developments may be having an effect on how people think about race today, especially among the well-educated—the sector of the public most likely to be knowledgeable about contemporary genetic science.

At the crossroads of two trends—on one hand, the post-World War II recoil from biological accounts of racial difference, and on the other, the growing admiration for the advances of genetic science—the American public’s conception of race is a phenomenon that merits greater attention from sociologists than it has received to date. Despite the centrality of race to academic and lay discussions of American society, quantitative research on public conceptualizations of race—our definitions of what race is and our understandings of how races differ from

each other—has been surprisingly limited (*pace* Condit et al. 2004). Instead, social scientific research has focused on racial attitudes, particularly evaluations of minority racial groups and opinions regarding race relations and policies (Bobo 2001, Krysan 2000; Schuman et al. 1997). And, although such empirical data have been used at times to surmise whether respondents understand racial differences as the product of nature or nurture, they are not collected with such a goal in mind (Krysan 1998; Schuman et al.; GSS 1977-2002). In order to better understand the extent of support for biological conceptions of racial difference and the prevalence of biological justifications for social inequality, this paper uses a list experiment method to explore the following research questions: 1) What is the true proportion of support for genetic explanation of racial equality? 2) Is there a social desirability effect? 3) How do true support and social desirability vary by social status?

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Academic studies of essentialism and constructionism in general, and of racial concepts in particular, frequently suggest that lower social status—whether female as opposed to male (Lieberman 1997), black versus white (Jayaratne 2002; Shanklin 2000), or the poor compared to the more affluent (Littlefield, Lieberman and Reynolds 1982)—tends to be associated with a rejection of biological notions of difference. As Stark *et al.* (1979: 97) hypothesized, “those who have benefited more from the extant structure of social relationships will tend to grant more legitimacy to the use of a concept reflecting and supporting that structure”; this view is a common feature of more theoretical literature on constructionism as well (Gergen 1998; Shakespeare 1998). It should be noted, however, that other researchers suggest that both the more highly-educated and those in higher-level occupations are more likely to reject biological notions of race (Apostle et al. 1983; Stark, Reynolds and Lieberman 1979). In addition to the factors of gender, race, or class, researchers have also suggested that age plays a role—specifically, younger people may be more likely to reject racial essentialism—but it is unclear whether these findings reflect a life-course trend or a cohort effect reflecting the ideas that prevailed in a given generation’s period of youth and formative education (Lieberman and Jackson 1995: 239). Finally, place of residence may be associated with racial conceptualization. When Stark *et al.* (1979: 91) asked survey respondents their opinion of the anti-essentialist statement, “No races exist now or ever did,” those who agreed were much more likely to live in the Northeast or the West than those who did not (83 versus 57 percent).

However, these examinations of the status correlates of support for racially essentialist attitudes do not always systematically account for the bias introduced by socially-desirable reporting—survey participants report the answers they believe to be most in keeping with social mores rather than their true opinion.⁵ Survey data on racial attitudes has proven to be significantly effected by social desirability bias. Social desirability effects can distort survey data through the over-reporting of opinions that are socially acceptable or the under-reporting of socially-unacceptable ones, making it difficult for researchers to ascertain true support for a query about racial attitudes and to accurately discern the relationships between variables. Thus, the downward time trend in whites’ ascription of racial disparities to blacks’ lesser “in-born ability” detailed above (Schuman et al. 1997) may say more about changing social mores concerning race-related discussion than it does about fundamental shifts in belief. Such a conclusion is also supported by discourse analysis of whites’ race-related conversation (Bonilla-Silva 2003; Frankenberg 1993).

Sociodemographic factors including gender, class, race, region, and education have been shown to influence social desirability effects. Socially-desirable reporting is significantly gendered; both male and female survey responses to questions about housework, gender roles and relationship expectations are typically consistent with prevailing cultural norms (Press and Townsley 1998; Theriault and Holmberg 1998). Using longitudinal national sample data, Johnson and Marini (1998) found that white women expressed more favorable attitudes toward blacks than did white men, a characteristic that is consistent with the women’s socialization and the social expectation that they be more empathetic and “out-focused” than men. However, in a complementary study, white women were more likely than white men to support policies to promote equality for blacks in principal, yet they were no more likely than white men to support government funding for programs to help blacks to improve their lot (Bobo and Kluegel 1993). This discrepancy suggests a gendered social desirability effect with regard to racial attitudes. Although those with advanced levels of education, and as a consequence, more familiarity with publicly-acceptable racial attitudes, have been associated with strong social desirability effects (Jackman and Muha 1984); acquiescence bias (a tendency to agree with survey statements and/or the interviewer) has been documented among the less-educated (Jackman 1973). Acquiescence bias is also present for other social

⁵ A noted exception is a recent study by Toby Jayaratne and her collaborators, which found that beliefs in genetic causes of social inequality are widespread in the general population, but that many respondents were reluctant to talk about genetic sources of racial inequality (personal communication with Dr. Jayaratne).

categories; respondents are more likely to agree with interviewers who share their race (Davis 1997) or gender (Kane and Macaulay 1993). Contrary to studies that found white racial attitudes towards black to be consistent across regions of the U.S. (e.g. Schuman and Bobo 1988), Kuklinski, Cobb and Gilens (1997) found that white Southerners did not express their true racial attitudes in surveys, but rather more socially-acceptable opinions. While a number of studies have attempted to measure social desirability bias with regard to racial attitudes, most have focused on racial policy preferences rather than genetic accounts of racial inequality (Krysan 1998; Schuman *et al.* 1997). Given the growth of genetic explanations for biological and social phenomena alike in the public sphere, social scientists should devote serious effort to gauging the extent to which socially-desirable survey response obscures the incidence of essentialist ideas of racial difference.

III. RESEARCH DESIGN

A. Methodology

To measure the extent to which social desirability curtails respondents' support for essentialist explanations of racial difference, we employ a "list experiment" design (Kuklinski, Cobb and Gilens 1997). This approach calls for the random assignment of survey participants to either a baseline group or an experimental (or "test") group. Members of the baseline group were presented with three statements. None of the statements for this group were related to the construct of interest (i.e. genetic conceptualization of race). Respondents were asked to indicate the number of statements (from zero to three) with which they agreed. However, they were expressly instructed to *not* reveal which exactly were the statements with which they agreed or disagreed. The baseline group question ran as follows:

Please tell us with *how many* of the statements listed below you agree. We don't want to know which ones, just *how many*.

- The U.S. military action in Iraq will ultimately make the United States safer.
- The space program is a waste of taxpayer money.
- Immigration is good for the economy.

Number of statements you agree with: _____

Next, the experimental group was presented with the same statements and instructions. However, in addition, the statement “Genetic differences contribute to income inequality between black and white people” was added to the end of the list, bringing the total number of statements to four. The added “test” statement was designed to measure belief in race having a genetic underpinning. Again, respondents in the experimental group were instructed to indicate the number of items they agreed with (which now could range from zero to four)—but not which items in particular.

Comparison between the baseline and test groups’ results is the list experiment’s fundamental strategy for estimating the degree of “true” support for a given statement in an unobtrusive way. As Kuklinski, Cobb and Gilens (1997: 328) explain:

The logic of the analysis is to compare the average number of items named in the test condition, with its maximum of four, to the average in the baseline condition, with its maximum of three. More precisely, subtracting the baseline from the experimental mean and multiplying by 100 provides an estimate of the level of anger directed toward the race item. Suppose, for example, that the estimated means in the baseline and test condition are 2.0 and 2.5, respectively. Because there is only one additional item in the test condition, the only way that the 0.5 increase can occur is for half of the treatment group to express anger at the race item.

Note the assumption—based on the random assignment of individuals to either the baseline or experimental group—that had the experimental group been given only three statements, its average number of statements agreed with would be the same as the mean observed in the baseline group (i.e. 2.0 statements in the example given above). We also assume that the number of statements that respondents face does not affect their likelihood of agreeing with those items.

The method described by Kuklinski *et al.* aims to provide an unobtrusive measure of “true” support for the sensitive fourth, “test” statement on race—that is, a measure that is unbiased by socially-desirable reporting. However, to gauge the magnitude of the social desirability effect, this indicator of “true” support must be compared to a measure that does incorporate a social desirability bias. For this reason, we introduce a third, “comparison” group of respondents. The members of this group were presented with the same four statements that the test group respondents had faced, but instead of being asked to report the number of items they agreed with, the comparison group subjects were asked directly whether they agreed or not with each of the statements. The result is a series of proportions indicating the share of respondents who agreed with each statement. These

proportions were then subtracted from our estimates of the “true” support for the race-related fourth statements in order to calculate the magnitude of the social desirability effect.

The list-experiment approach represents an important innovation in the measure of social desirability effects. First, social desirability is often suggested as a factor when interpreting sensitive survey results, yet its effect is rarely quantified. Second, attempts to measure social desirability through questions designed to gauge individuals’ likelihood of reporting socially desirable answers suffer from this source of bias themselves. For this reason, the unobtrusive approach employed in the list experiment—notably, its non-identification of any given individual’s opinion—is unlikely to provoke respondent concerns about revealing their true beliefs. Our project builds further on Kuklinski *et al.*’s development of the list experiment in two ways. First, as already mentioned, we include a third comparison group that permits us to estimate the presence and size of social desirability effects. Second, we make explicit the calculation of standard errors for our estimates of both true support for the sensitive statement and any social desirability effect. We are especially interested in the effect of education. Although most studies find that education is associated strongly and negatively with racist attitudes (e.g. Sniderman et al. 1991), this could at least in part be due to increased social desirability effects among the better educated. The difference in the mean number of items chosen between the test group and the comparison group should be higher among college-educated respondents than among others if this hypothesis were correct.

Once the degree of “true support” for the statement on genetics and racial inequality is estimated, the standard error for the estimate can be calculated by treating it as a difference between means. Even though we interpret the “true support” figure as a proportion (e.g. 50 percent of respondents truly support the race statement), the point estimate is calculated by taking the difference between the baseline and the experimental mean number of items supported. (Our hypothesis is that the experimental mean is greater than the baseline mean, so their difference is greater than zero.) Consequently, the standard error for the estimate of “true support” is calculated by deriving the standard error of the distribution of mean differences. We do so using a pooled estimator of the underlying population variance and incorporating the assumption that the baseline and test groups are independent samples (Carlson and Thorne 1997: 439-440).

B. Data

Thanks to the NSF-funded project Time-sharing Experiments in the Social Sciences (TESS), we were able to add a question module to the omnibus survey that TESS regularly constructs and fields.⁶ Our sample consists of 1,020 adults aged 18 and over, randomly selected from across the nation to participate in a Web-based survey.⁷ Potential respondents were sampled using random-digit dialing. Once contacted, they were offered free internet access in exchange for participation in multiple Web-based marketing and research surveys. Consequently, our subjects may have participated in other online surveys prior to ours. Sociodemographic characteristics of the sample are reported in table 1. Seventeen percent of the respondents reside in the northeastern United States, 22 percent in the West, 30 percent in the South, and 31 percent in the Midwest. Because our survey includes a measure of anti-black prejudice, African Americans were excluded from the sample. Eighty-nine percent of the respondents identified themselves as white and non-Hispanic, while nine percent identified as Hispanic.

<<<Table 1 about here>>>>

Collecting data via the internet offers certain advantages over telephone, in-person, or written surveys. They may be easier than the first two in that they permit respondents to read the questions for themselves and can go back over one or more items at will. As a result, this format may be particularly effect for list experiments like ours because such experiments could contain more items, and more complex contents could be communicated than is possible in a personal interview. However, a possible drawback of the written format is that having time to think carefully about the items without an interviewer waiting for the response may increase social desirability and thereby defeat the purpose of the list experiment. We also expect that a web-based survey will be less susceptible to socially desirable reporting than telephone (or in-person) interviews, because it is self-administered (Fowler 1995). Given the range of potential effects of the survey mode on list-experiment measurements of socially desirable reporting, which we will be able to explore in future comparisons of our internet to our telephone interview results, we expect this research to yield valuable information for future research on the measurement of social desirability effects.

⁶ For more information on TESS, see <http://www.experimentcentral.org/>.

⁷ The survey is administered by the company Knowledge Networks on behalf of TESS.

IV. FINDINGS

A. Randomization

Before going on to the list experiment results, we briefly address the question of whether randomization was in fact successful. Through random assignment, 335 respondents were assigned to the baseline group, 369 to the test group, and 316 to the comparison group, for a total sample size of 1020. To check that no group had strongly disparate characteristics compared to the others, we examined the composition of each group in terms of gender, age, education, household income, region, urban residence, and Hispanic ethnicity (see Table 1). More specifically, we used chi-square analyses to determine whether treatment group assignment showed any relationship to these socio-demographic factors, rather than being independent of such characteristics. Our expectation that randomization had been successful and group assignment carried out without regard to socio-demographic characteristics was largely borne out, with two exceptions. First, the share of non-Hispanic whites varies noticeably across groups, from 86 percent of the comparison group to nearly 92 percent of the baseline group. This distribution could bias our estimate of the social desirability effect upward, as white underrepresentation in the comparison group could depress that group's agreement with the race statement and thus inflate its calculated difference from our estimate of "true" support. Second, household income demonstrated an even greater relationship to treatment group status, such that the baseline group has a disproportionately large middle-income share and small lower-income share relative to the test and comparison groups. Given the uncertainty about how income might be related to social desirability, however, it is difficult to predict how the baseline group's relative affluence might influence our findings.

B. Revealed Levels of True Support for a Genetic Account of Racial Inequality

As Table 2 shows, the mean number of statements agreed with by the baseline group was 1.01, and the mean rose to 1.23 in the experimental group. Therefore, by taking the difference between these means, we estimate the true proportion of supporters of this statement at 22 percent, with a confidence interval (CI) of 9 to 34 percent ($p=0.001$). Next we calculate the degree of true support for the genetic account of inequality for each of a series of subgroups. Table 2 shows that men and women are almost equally likely to agree with the race

statement (21 and 23 percent do so, respectively), and these levels of support are both statistically greater than zero.

<<<Table 2 about here>>>

Similarly, whites—who make up the majority of the respondents—also show a statistically significant degree of revealed support for the race statement (20 percent). Although Hispanics and non-white non-Hispanics appear to be even more likely than whites to agree with the statement, their small numbers in our sample lead to such large standard errors around their point estimates that we cannot conclude their support levels differ significantly from zero.

Turning to age, we find that respondents aged 45 and above are more likely than younger adults to support a genetic rationale for racial inequality. (To avoid small sample sizes, we use only two age groups). Those in the older group are more than twice as likely to agree with this perspective; 29 percent do so ($p < 0.05$), compared to 14 percent (n.s.) among the younger respondents. Comparing the groups by level of education yielded a surprising result: more highly-educated respondents were more likely to adhere to a genetic interpretation of inequality than those whose education had not advanced beyond high school. We estimate that 28 percent of respondents who had at least attended some college truly support the genetic statement, whereas only 12 percent of those with a high-school degree or less did so. While the estimate for the less-educated is not statistically different from zero, the estimate for college-educated respondents is highly significant. Interestingly, household income shows the opposite relationship than that for education: the less income respondents have, the higher the estimated proportion agreeing with the race item. Roughly half of the respondents with household incomes under \$30,000 but only 24 percent of those with incomes between \$30,000 and under \$50,000 agree with the item. For those with incomes of \$50,000 and higher, the estimated proportion is 4 percent and not statistically significant.

Finally, we consider the relationship of location to genetic conceptualization of race. In terms of region, the West and the Midwest are the areas where we estimate the highest levels of “true” support for the genetic race statement: 35 and 29 percent of the respondents in those areas agreed with the statement, respectively, and both estimates are statistically different from zero. Our estimate for the South of 18 percent, in contrast, is not

statistically significant; nor is the point estimate for the Northeast. In terms of urban location, 20 percent of the respondents from large metropolitan areas seem to support the genetic statement. Although those in non-metropolitan areas show a higher rate of agreement with the statement, this estimate is not statistically different from zero, in contrast to the statistically significant estimate for metropolitan respondents.

In summary, we estimate that 22 percent of our sample truly agrees with the idea that genetics helps explain racial inequality. Moreover, we find evidence that this level of agreement varies by most of the socio-demographic factors we consider. First, simple comparison of the differing proportions of support within each subgroup suggests that every factor except gender is related to racial conceptualization. Second, difference of proportions tests between related subgroups (calculations not shown) shows them to have statistically significant differences in their levels of support, with the exception of ethnicity. So for example, the 16-point difference between the proportion of less-educated respondents who support the race statement (12 percent) and the share of highly-educated subjects who do the same (28 percent) is statistically significant at the 95 percent level.

C. The Effect of Socially Desirable Reporting

Having estimated the “true” level of support for the genetic interpretation of race, we can now compare it to the overt support for the statement offered by respondents in the comparison group, when asked directly for their opinion of the item. The difference between the two yields our estimate of the magnitude of the social desirability effect; Table 3 shows our findings. When respondents in the comparison group were asked directly whether they agreed with the statement on genetics and race, only 13 percent said they did. This figure is significantly lower than the 22 percent we estimated as “truly” supporting the race statement. As a result, we conclude that the social desirability effect for this item equals $(22 - 13 =)$ 9 percentage points. Moreover, we find this result to be statistically significant, having calculated the estimate’s standard errors using a difference-of-proportions test.

<<<Table 3 about here>>>

When we stratify the sample by gender, we uncover an interesting finding. Recall that men and women hardly varied in their revealed levels of true support for the genetic race statement. However, they do vary

considerably in terms of their susceptibility to socially desirable reporting. While men's overt support for the genetic statement (18 percent) barely dips from their estimated "true" support (21 percent), women's overt support is more strongly depressed, falling to only 8 percent compared to their estimated true support of 23 percent. As a result, the estimated social desirability effect for men is minimal (3 percentage points) and not statistically significant, whereas the estimate for women is much larger (15 points) and statistically significant. In short, women seem more likely to modify their answers to correspond to the responses they believe are most socially desirable.

Since they make up the overwhelming majority of the sample, non-Hispanic whites' estimated social desirability effect of 8 percentage points is very close to that of the sample as a whole. Although there is evidence that this effect is even greater among Hispanics (12 percent) and especially non-Hispanic non-whites (34 percent), the latter two estimates are not statistically significant. As anticipated, age plays a role in socially desirable reporting. Not only are younger adults less likely than older people to support the genetic account of racial inequality, but they are also less likely to vary their answers when constrained to state them overtly. Respondents under 45 showed virtually no desirability effect, whereas we show that among those 45 and over, the proportion who openly agree with the race statement (13 percent) is less than half the share we estimate as truly adhering to it (29 percent). As a result, for younger adults we calculate a social desirability effect of only 1 percentage point, which is not statistically different from zero, compared to a statistically significant effect of 16 percentage points for older respondents.

Educational attainment seems to function in much the same way as older age does. Advanced education not only increases support for the genetic view of race, but it also increases socially desirable reporting. In fact, the social desirability effect among the college-educated is so strong that it completely reverses the direction of the relationship between education and race concept. According to our estimates of "true" support for the genetics item, respondents with at least some college education were more than twice as likely to hold this biologicistic view (28 percent did so versus 12 percent of those with a high-school degree or less). However, when asked directly to openly state their opinion of the genetics statement, the share of the college-educated respondents to agree with it plummeted to 10 percent, compared to the non-college group's 17 percent (actually higher than their "true" agreement of 10 percent). This switch suggests that socially desirable reporting not only

blunts the magnitude of measured support for essentialist race concepts, but that it may altogether reverse the directionality of hypothesized relationships between education and racial conceptualization.

Like education, household income is related to socially desirable reporting, but not always in the expected fashion. When it comes to openly supporting the statement on race, respondents across the income spectrum are fairly similar; the proportions of respondents in each household income class who support the statement ranges only between 10 and 15 percent. However, underlying that apparent similarity, there is a wide divergence in the “true” levels of support across income groups, from 51 percent of those with household incomes below \$30,000 to 4 percent of those from households earning above \$50,000 a year. As a result, the estimated social desirability effect is largest for the low-income group; at 41 percentage points, this desirability effect is larger in magnitude than for any other subgroup examined here. At the other end of the income spectrum, we actually find a negative difference between the list experiment and the direct question. It is not clear how to interpret this finding. It may be sample fluctuation or indicate a problem with the randomization.⁸

We have expressed the magnitude of social desirability effects above in terms of the percentage point differences between proportions “truly” and proportions openly espousing a genetic explanation of racial inequality. A standardized approach, however, is to calculate the magnitude of the effect as the percentage decrease in the proportions of those truly and those openly agreeing with the statement. In this way, the drop in the whole sample’s “true” support of the statement at 22 percent, to 13 percent openly supporting it, can be expressed not as a 9 percentage-point drop but as a decrease of 40 percent (i.e. $(13-22)/22$). According to this standardized measure, the statistically significant social desirability effects are mostly in the range of 40 to 80 percent decreases for the various subgroups’ expression of a biological race notion (calculations not shown).

In summary, we find evidence not only of significant social desirability effects on respondents’ support for a genetic explanation of racial inequality, but we also find variation in the magnitude of this effect according to socio-demographic characteristics. Specifically, we find women, older adults, the college educated, members of low-income households, Midwesterners and Westerners, and those living outside urban areas to be particularly

⁸ An alternative explanation would be a kind of negative desirability effect for the highest-income group. In other words, high-income respondents may feel that the socially optimal answer is to agree with the idea that genetics account for racial inequality, and so they openly adhere to this view when asked, even if privately they are not convinced this is the case. One explanation may be that the mention of genetics in the statements lends it an air of scientific credibility and authority with which affluent respondents wish to identify.

likely to give socially desirable responses. Difference of proportion tests (results not shown) reveal that all these factors (except metropolitan residence) are significantly associated with socially desirable reporting.

V. CONCLUSION

According to our estimates, one in five non-black Americans attributes income inequality between black and white people to unspecified genetic differences between the two groups. To our knowledge, the only other population estimates that tap a similar attribution is the GSS item about ‘in-born ability to learn’ – which is at once more specific (with respect to the mechanism by which biology affect group differences) and less specific (with respect to the underlying biological cause). Nevertheless, after steadily declining for 25 years, in recent years, agreement with the GSS item in recent years comes very close to the direct question we tested in our survey (12 percent in the 2002 GSS compared to 13 percent). Asking direct questions about genetic causes of racial inequality may produce a substantial downward bias of estimates, a bias that is, we believe, owed to social desirability. We may indeed underestimate such bias because our direct question was part of a self-administered interview, which generally reduces social desirability (Fowler 1995).

In light of the scientific and pseudo-scientific discourse about the contribution of genes to social inequality, it is of great interest which groups are most likely to hold such beliefs, and which groups are less likely to admit to them. According to our data, older people, those who live in the West and Midwest, and those with higher education are more likely than others to believe in genetic causes of inequality, and at the same time, are less likely to say so. Women are just as likely as men to have such beliefs, but much less likely to admit to it. If we can corroborate these findings with the data from the telephone survey, which is still underway, our study points to a set of insights further research in the social construction of racial difference should explore more in-depth (or at least be aware of).

Beliefs about genetic causes of racial inequality may be more widespread than we think. They are especially high among the better educated, who may be most likely to be exposed to the new (and old) genetic science and therefore most likely to associate genes with social outcomes. Because they are more likely to benefit from income differences, they may pay greater attention and give more credit to theories that justify and legitimize such differences. On the other hand, they are also more likely to know that expressing such beliefs

would be politically incorrect, and therefore more likely to disguise their true beliefs when asked directly. This is especially important because just like women, the better educated are traditionally seen as supporters of affirmative action and other policies aimed at reducing racial inequality. Support for such policies may indeed be weaker than we think, to the extent that it is indeed associated with beliefs about genetic causes of racial inequality.

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Table 1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Sample, by Experimental Treatment Condition

PERCENT	Total Sample	Treatment Condition:			Chi-Square Significance (p)
		Baseline	Test	Comparison	
<i>Sample Size (n)</i>	(1,020)	- (335)	(369)	(316)	- - -
Gender					0.43
Male	46.8	44.8	46.1	49.7	
Female	53.2	55.2	53.9	50.3	
Ethnicity					0.09 *
White Non-Hispanic	88.8	91.6	88.3	86.4	
Hispanic	8.9	6.3	10.3	10.1	
Other	2.3	2.1	1.4	3.5	
Age					0.78
18 – 44 years	47.7	47.2	46.9	49.4	
45 + years	52.3	52.8	53.1	50.6	
Education					0.45
High School or less	40.8	39.4	39.5	43.7	
Some College or more	59.2	60.6	60.4	56.3	
Household Income					.047 **
Under \$30K/yr	29.0	23.6	32.8	30.4	
\$30K - \$50K	31.0	35.5	27.1	30.7	
Over \$50K/yr	40.0	40.9	40.1	38.9	
Region					0.57
Northeast	16.9	17.0	16.3	17.4	
Midwest	31.0	34.3	27.9	31.0	
South	30.1	28.7	32.8	28.5	
West	22.1	20.0	23.0	23.1	
Urban					0.86
Metropolitan Area	82.6	82.4	83.5	82.0	
Non-Metropolitan Area	17.4	17.6	16.5	18.0	

Table 2. Calculation of "True Support" for Genetic Explanation of Racial Inequality

	N Statements Agreed With		Proportion "True Support"	Standard Error	Confidence Interval	
	<u>Baseline</u>	<u>Test</u>			<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
Total Sample	1.01	1.23	0.22	0.06	0.09	0.34
Men	1.03	1.24	0.21	0.09	0.04	0.39
Women	0.99	1.22	0.23	0.09	0.04	0.40
White	1.00	1.20	0.20	0.07	0.07	0.33
Other	1.57	2.00	0.43	0.63	-0.98	1.84
Hispanic	1.00	1.37	0.37	0.21	-0.04	0.78
18-44 years old	1.10	1.23	0.14	0.09	-0.05	0.33
45 +	0.94	1.23	0.29	0.09	0.12	0.46
High School or less	1.08	1.20	0.12	0.10	-0.09	0.32
Some College or more	0.97	1.25	0.28	0.08	0.12	0.44
HH Inc < 30K	0.82	1.33	0.51	0.13	0.25	0.75
30K < HH Inc < 50K	1.10	1.34	0.24	0.11	0.02	0.46
HH Inc > 50K	1.04	1.08	0.04	0.10	-0.16	0.23
Northeast	1.02	0.98	-0.04	0.16	-0.35	0.28
Midwest	1.02	1.31	0.29	0.11	0.08	0.51
South	1.05	1.23	0.18	0.12	-0.06	0.42
West	0.94	1.29	0.35	0.14	0.08	0.63
Non-Metro	0.88	1.20	0.32	0.16	-0.01	0.64
Metropolitan Area	1.04	1.24	0.20	0.07	0.06	0.33

Note: Estimates in bold are statistically significant at the 95 percent level.

Table 3. Estimates of Social Desirability Effect on Support for Genetic Explanation of Racial Inequality

	Proportion * "True" Support	Proportion Overt Support	Overt Support Stand. Error	Confidence Interval		Desirability Effect	Desirability Stand. Error	Confidence Interval	
				Low	High			Low	High
Total Internet Sample	0.22	0.13	0.02	0.09	0.17	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.14
Men	0.21	0.18	0.03	0.12	0.25	0.03	0.04	-0.06	0.12
Women	0.23	0.08	0.02	0.04	0.14	0.15	0.04	0.08	0.22
White	0.20	0.12	0.02	0.08	0.16	0.08	0.03	0.02	0.14
Other	0.43	0.09	0.09	-0.08	0.26	0.34	0.22	-0.09	0.77
Hispanic	0.37	0.25	0.08	0.10	0.40	0.12	0.12	-0.11	0.35
18-44 years old	0.14	0.13	0.03	0.08	0.18	0.01	0.04	-0.06	0.09
45 +	0.29	0.13	0.03	0.08	0.18	0.16	0.04	0.07	0.24
High School or less	0.12	0.17	0.03	0.11	0.24	-0.05	0.04	-0.13	0.03
Some College or more	0.28	0.10	0.02	0.06	0.16	0.18	0.04	0.11	0.26
HH Inc < 30K	0.51	0.10	0.03	0.05	0.18	0.41	0.06	0.29	0.52
30K < HH Inc < 50K	0.24	0.15	0.04	0.09	0.24	0.09	0.05	-0.02	0.19
HH Inc > 50K	0.04	0.13	0.03	0.08	0.20	-0.09	0.03	-0.16	-0.02
Northeast	-0.04	0.18	0.05	0.09	0.31	-0.22	0.04	-0.31	-0.13
Midwest	0.29	0.11	0.03	0.06	0.19	0.18	0.05	0.07	0.28
South	0.18	0.14	0.04	0.08	0.23	0.04	0.05	-0.07	0.14
West	0.35	0.10	0.03	0.04	0.19	0.25	0.06	0.13	0.38
Non-Metro	0.32	0.16	0.05	0.06	0.26	0.16	0.08	0.01	0.31
Metropolitan Area	0.20	0.12	0.02	0.08	0.16	0.08	0.03	0.02	0.14

* From Table 2.

Note: Estimates in bold are statistically significant at the 95 percent level.